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Abstract
This paper examines how comparative advantages of major beef exporters
changed following the 2003 bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak,
which significantly disrupted the U.S. beef trade until approximately 2007. Using
longitudinal data on beef export values and constructed revealed comparative
advantagemeasures, we show that while somemeasures of the long-run impacts
of BSE on U.S. beef export competitiveness have returned to pre-2003 levels, the
U.S.’s comparative advantage has not. We also examine a hypothetical scenario
of no BSE event in 2003 and predict that in the absence of the BSE outbreak, the
U.S. beef sector would have been increasingly more competitive by 2017 than it
actually was. Long-term trade competitiveness may not simply return to normal
even after a short-term disruption.
KEYWORDS
beef exports, BSE, comparative advantage, competition, international trade, trade disruption
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1 INTRODUCTION
Shocks from trade disputes, phytosanitary emergencies,
and weather impact agricultural export markets. Affected
exporters always hope such events are short-lived, yet even
when they are, trade interruptions can take time to return
to normal. The United States’ 2012 drought created oppor-
tunities for non-U.S. corn exporters to increase market
share in South Korea where the United States is still try-
ing to rebuild its share (USDA-ERS, 2020). A trade dis-
pute beginning in 2018 between the United States and
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
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China that led to additional tariffs on U.S. agricultural
products including corn, soybeans, cotton, and pork is
another example (Marchant & Wang, 2018). Notably, the
price spread between United States and Brazilian soybean
exports widened to a record-high immediately after tariffs
were imposed by China around the middle of 2018, with
the U.S. soybean export price remaining low relative to
the Brazilian price throughout the rest of the year (Good,
2018). By assuming the tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods
remain in effect for the next 10 years, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) predicts that U.S.
Agricultural Economics. 2020;51:941–957. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/agec 941
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soybean exports would not return to pre-trade-war levels
until 2028 (O’Donoghue, Hansen, & Stallings, 2019).
In late 2019 and early 2020, the United States and China
announced a “Phase one” agreement returning some tar-
iffs to pre-2018 levels and freezing others. Nevertheless, the
competitive structure of markets may have adjusted in the
interim. U.S. farmers are rightly concerned that adverse
effects of even short-lived disruptions could permanently
alter market relationships as other exporters erode the
U.S.’s share in global markets (Balistreri et al., 2018; Elmer
& Crampton, 2019; Hirtzer, 2019). In particular, once
China finds new trading partners, renegotiation costs can
slow any returning market share just as it did for U.S.
grain markets following the short-lived 1980 U.S. embargo
of the former Soviet Union (Balistreri et al., 2018). Similar
evidence can be observed from the recent African Swine
Fever outbreaks in China. As the Chinese demand for
pork in the global market surged, the United States, in part
due to the then ongoing U.S.-China trade disputes, failed
to capture as much share of the market compared to major
competitors in Europe and LatinAmerica (Xiong&Zhang,
2019).
In this paper, we shed light on how long it takes
an export market to recover from a trade disruption.
Although at this writing, the current U.S. and China trade
disruptions are making headlines, it is difficult to forecast
long-run outcomes for something that has limited data.We
simply do not know the extent to which the disputes are
permanently changing export relationships. The outbreak
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known
asmad cow disease, in December 2003 in the United States
provides an imperfect yet insightful case study. At the time
of the outbreak, it was unclear what the long-run impli-
cations to U.S. beef might be. From January 2004 through
approximately April 2007, U.S. beef trade withmany coun-
tries vanished, was restricted, or was intermittent (USDA-
FAS, 2019). Using longitudinal data on beef export values,
we study the long-run impacts of BSE on U.S. beef export
competitiveness, construct the hypothetical scenario of no
BSE event in 2003, and then predict what competitiveness
might have looked like for the U.S. beef sector.
We create an empirical proxy to measure country-level
beef industry comparative advantage over time: the indi-
cator for competitiveness in our study. We show that while
the U.S. beef export values have mostly recovered to their
pre-BSE levels, the U.S.’s comparative advantage is yet to
return towhere it was prior to the BSE outbreak.We jointly
estimate the effect of the BSE outbreak on the comparative
advantages of other major exporters. We find that in the
absence of the 2003 U.S. BSE event, the U.S. would have
kept its comparative advantage in beef; moreover, its com-
petitiveness would have grown over time. The results indi-
cate significant lingering impacts of BSE on U.S. beef com-
petitiveness that are less obvious when examining export
values alone.
This study contributes to the literature in the following
ways. First, we construct a modified revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) index proposed by Yu, Cai, and Leung
(2009) to present the trends of comparative advantage
of the U.S. beef industry and other major competitors
from year to year. The RCA index was first proposed by
Balassa (1977) and reformulated in Balassa (1986), and is
used frequently when looking for changes in a country’s
trade status (Fertö & Hubbard, 2003; Gorton, Davidova,
& Ratinger, 2000). However, the original RCA index is
neither symmetric nor does it hold either cardinal or ordi-
nal properties (Hoen & Oosterhaven, 2006; Laursen, 2015;
Vollrath, 1991; Yu et al., 2009). The asymmetric distribution
of the RCA index would violate the normality assumption
of error terms in the regression setting. As such, it is
not appropriate to be used in our analysis, which aims
to estimate and compare comparative advantage among
countries and across time. The reformulated RCA index
developed and used by Yu et al. (2009) resolves these limi-
tations. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have used
an RCA index to study the impact of BSE on beef export
competitiveness.
The present research closely relates to the literature
examining the trade impacts of BSE events. Morgan (2001)
simulates the impacts assuming different scenarios of the
effects of earlier BSE outbreaks in Europe on the interna-
tional beef market showing that beef exports would return
to the baseline level by 2006. Mutondo, Brorsen, and Hen-
neberry (2009) and Panagiotou and Azzam (2010) study
the welfare loss of U.S. beef producers due to trade bans
after the 2003 BSE outbreaks in the United States and esti-
mate a loss ranging from $500 to more than $700 million
annually. Wigle, Weerahewa, Bredahl, and Samarajeewa
(2007) study the effects of trade restrictions due to BSE out-
breaks in Canada and find that the general equilibrium
effect produces gains for consumers that partially offset
producers’ losses. However, these studies focus on short-
run effects. Using the evidence of the 2003 U.S. BSE out-
breaks, the unique contribution of our study is highlight-
ing that trade impacts affect competitiveness long after the
disruption ends.
Our study also fits into a broader literature that studies
different aspects of the adverse economic impacts of BSE
outbreaks in both the United States and other countries.
Research finds negative impacts on both demand for beef
products (e.g., Burton & Young, 1996; Mangen & Burrell,
2001; Peterson & Chen, 2005; Verbeke & Ward, 2001) as
well as producer prices along the beef supply chain (e.g.,
Hassouneh, Serra, & Gil, 2010; Lloyd, McCorriston, Mor-
gan, & Rayner, 2001; Park, Jin, & Bessler, 2008) in Euro-
pean countries or in major beef-importing countries in the
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aftermath of either local or global BSE events. Studies of
BSE events in the United States have examined the effects
of food scares from BSE outbreaks on cattle futures prices
and beef sales adjustments, finding evidence of significant
structural breaks of futures prices and adverse effects on
beef sales following BSE events (Jin, Power, & Elbakidze,
2008; Marsh, Brester, & Smith, 2008; Schlenker & Villas-
Boas, 2009; Taha & Hahn, 2014). We extend the literature
by providing evidence of the impact of an outbreak of BSE
on a country’s international competitiveness.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide
background information on the U.S. beef sector’s compet-
itiveness in the world market, as well as a brief history of
the BSE outbreak in the United States. Section 3 describes
the data construction process and presents summary statis-
tics. Section 4 lays out the empirical analyses and discusses
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses future
research.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 U.S. beef export competitiveness
The U.S. beef industry operates in a highly competi-
tive global marketplace (Murphy, Pendell, & Smith, 2009;
Pendell, Tonsor, Dhuyvetter, Brester, & Schroeder, 2013;
Schroeder & Tonsor, 2012). Major competitors include
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Mexico
(USDA-FAS, 2019). Historically, the United States has held
a comparative advantage in beef production due to a well-
developed infrastructure and a reputation for both meat
quality and food safety (Adcock, Hudson, Rosson, Harris,
& Herndon, 2006; Golan et al., 2004). However, trade rela-
tionships, exchange rates, and economic growth rates have
all had differing impacts on export competitiveness.
2.2 2003 U.S. BSE outbreak
BSE is a neurological disorder of cattle that cannot yet be
treated or vaccinated against. Cattle affected byBSE experi-
ence degeneration of the nervous system. BSE can be cate-
gorized into two types—classical (C-type) and atypical (H-
type or L-type). Only the classical BSE is zoonotic, where
humans can become infected through consumption of dis-
eased beef products, but symptoms do not appear for some
time, making diagnosis, and hence food recalls, more dif-
ficult.1 The disease was officially recognized in the 1980s,
and the first diagnosis of classical BSE was reported in
1 See more discussion at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/
animal_health/fs-bse.pdf.
the United Kingdom in 1986, with thousands of diagnoses
reported over the next decade.
The first case of classical BSE confirmed in North Amer-
ica was in Alberta, Canada inMay 2003. In December 2003
a cow in Washington also tested positive for C-type BSE.
Immediately, import bans againstUnited States (andCana-
dian) beef products arose. Most markets, including Japan
and South Korea, that weremajor buyers of U.S. beef at the
time, did not reopen their markets until after 2006. Since
then, the United States has strengthened regulations on
feed imports by following the World Organization for Ani-
malHealth (OIE) guidelines, aswell as increased traceabil-
ity of cattle travelling across state borders. There have only
been five cases of BSE confirmed in the United States since
the 2003 discovery inWashington; all diagnosed as atypical
BSE and did not lead to trade issues. In fact, in 2013 theU.S.
BSE-status was upgraded to a negligible risk by the OIE. In
2015, the OIE excluded atypical BSE forms from the classi-
cal BSE general risk provisions.
3 DATA
This study examines the 12 largest beef exporters since the
1980s. For each country, we collect annual data on beef
(standard international trade classification (SITC):Meat of
bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen) export value as
well as total (SITC: All commodities) export value, which
include beef and all other goods from every industry, from
the UN Comtrade database from 1980 to 2018.2 We employ
linear interpolation to replace three missing observations
by calculating the simple average of previous-year and
next-year observations in order to have a balanced dataset.3
Figure 1 displays beef export values (inUSD) of the 12 coun-
tries over the sample period. U.S. beef export values experi-
enced a sharp decline immediately after the BSE outbreak
in 2003, recovered around 2006, and arguably returned to
pre-BSE levels around 2010. Meanwhile, major competi-
tors seem to have absorbed the U.S.’s lost market share to
different degrees. Notably, Australia and Brazil surpassed
the United States in export value after the BSE outbreak.
In fact, the United States did not regain its lead measured
by export value until 2017. It is worth noting that while
India has also become one of the largest beef exporters,
particularly since the late 2000s, its growth was not due
to the 2003 U.S. BSE outbreak, as India beef, composed of
2 “All commodities” refers to all exports, including total merchandise
of all goods across industries. This is a term defined in the UN Com-
trade reference guide (available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/50039/UN-Comtrade-Reference-Tables).
3 No reasons arementioned on theComtrade online databasewebpage for
the threemissing observations (out of 444 observations in total). These are
Nicaragua in 1987, Panama in 1987, and Paraguay in 1981.
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F IGURE 1 Annual beef export values (billion USD) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
almost 50%water buffalo, arguably serves a different clien-
tele than that of the major competitors (Aradhey, 2019;
Landes, Melton, & Edwards, 2016).
Variable summary statistics and data sources are given
inTable 1. The sample period, 1981 to 2017, ends just prior to
the U.S. engagement on trade renegotiations with Mexico,
Canada, and China.
3.1 Normalized revealed comparative
advantage index
Constructing RCA indices for the United States as well as
for 11 other major beef exporting countries, we examine
whether the United States has held a comparative advan-
tage in beef exports. TheRCA indices of Balassa (1977, 1986)
were proposed as empirical proxies for Ricardian compar-
ative advantage. Unfortunately, Balassa’s index only indi-
cates whether the country itself has a comparative advan-
tage in a specific product/sector, but it does not hold either
cardinal or ordinal properties. Therefore, one cannot com-
pare Balassa’s indices across countries. We adopt the nor-
malized RCA index (NRCA) proposed by Yu et al. (2009).4
The NRCA allows for symmetry and comparability, facili-
tating its use in an examination of changes to international
competitiveness. For a country 𝑖 exporting good 𝑗 (beef in













where 𝐸𝑖𝑗 is country 𝑖’s export of good 𝑗, 𝐸𝑖 is country
𝑖’s total export of all commodities, 𝐸𝑗 is world’s export of
4 See Sarker and Ratnasena (2014) for in-depth discussion of the devel-
opment of new RCA indices. The authors also adopt the modified RCA
index by Yu, Cai, and Leung (2009) in their analysis on Canadian beef
comparative advantage.
good 𝑗, and 𝐸 is world’s total export of all commodities.
All variables on the right-hand side of the equations are
measured in valuation.5 Under this formulation, a country
has a comparative advantage in beef (i.e., 𝑁𝑅𝐶𝐴 > 0) if it
enjoys a larger beef export market share than that of total
commodities, and does not have a comparative advantage
if otherwise (i.e.,𝑁𝑅𝐶𝐴 < 0).6 Another feature under such
formulation is that the NRCA will always range within
[−0.25, 0.25].7
3.2 Other data
We collect data on cattle stock and cattle slaughtered, as
they contribute to beef production and its export mar-
ket share. Cattle stock and cattle slaughtered are mea-
sured in head. To allow for comparison of cattle produc-
tion across countries, we further construct a cattle stock-
to-slaughter ratio. Exchange rates affect the relative prices
of beef exports, and therefore beef export values. Common
exchange rate measures are bilateral between two coun-
tries, but the exports (both beef and total commodities) are
to all trading partners. Therefore, we choose the national
currency per SDR (special drawing rights) as the preferred
indicator to proxy for the exchange rates, which is compa-
rable across our sample countries.8 To capture any under-
lying technological progress that could contribute to the
change in a country’s comparative advantage in beef, we
also include a linear trend variable.
5 Export values are all measured in USD throughout the study.
6 NRCA indices are relatively small (in absolute value) because of the nor-
malization, which is driven by the term 𝐸𝑗
𝐸
(i.e., because beef products
only account for a small share of total commodities in the global market).
7We refer readers to Yu et al. (2009) for the proof of the property.
8 The value of SDR is determined by a basket of currencies, including the
British pound sterling, the Chinese renminbi, the euro, the Japanese yen,
and the U.S. dollar.
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F IGURE 2 Normalized revealed comparative advantage [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Ideally, we would also like to control for other sources
of cattle production costs. Because not all exporters in our
analysis have available producer prices, we instead use the
inflation rate of local consumer prices, as the rate of change
between consumer and producer prices tend to be simi-
lar.9 Corn futures prices are used as a proxy for feed costs
to control for factors that are correlated with a country’s
comparative advantage in beef. As feed data are not read-
ily available for all countries, we use U.S. corn futures as a
covariant proxy for feed costs in other countries aswell.We
collect the U.S. corn futures prices, calculated as a simple
average of daily nearby corn futures prices during a year.
For the United States, we also include slaughtering labor
cost to better proxy for the cost of beef production.10
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
4.1 Revealed comparative advantage in
the beef sector
Figure 2 shows each country’s NRCA in beef exports over
the sample period.
Australia has been receiving a lower price in beef fin-
ishing, compared to most of its competitors, reflecting a
9 Consumer prices for all 12 countries are collected from the World Bank.
Data for Argentina are missing after 2013. We fill its missing values from
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
10 A note on using corn and labor costs. The United States is the world’s
largest producer and exporter of corn. As such, U.S. corn futures have a
major impact on the world corn price as well as the corn trade. Using
corn futures in country-specific regressions may not make the best proxy
for country-specific feed costs, but leaving it out is likely a worse decision
because of its correlation with those costs. As to using U.S. labor costs,
while such data are not available for the other countries, unlike usingU.S.
corn futures to proxy for country-specific feed costs, slaughtering labor
costs depend on many factors that are country specific and are not likely
tied to what is happening in U.S. labor markets.
lower production cost (Behrendt &Weeks, 2017).11 Indeed,
Australia has been leading other competitors in compar-
ative advantage. The United States had been enjoying an
increasingly strong share in the beef export market rela-
tive to its total exports since the 1980s, and started to have
a comparative advantage after the 1990s until the discovery
of BSE in December 2003. Like the impact on beef export
values, trade bans onU.S. beef resulted in an adverse shock
to its competitiveness, with the U.S. NRCA falling to lev-
els last seen in the late 1980s. What Figure 2 also shows
is that no single country completely snatched the lost U.S.
market advantages. Instead, U.S. competitiveness appears
to have been redistributed to a handful of other exporters.
This graphical evidence suggests that the market moved
toward a higher level of competitiveness all-around.12
4.2 Seemingly unrelated regressions
(SURs) estimation
Next we estimate the impacts of the BSE outbreak on
comparative advantages in beef. We correlate the NRCA
with variables we consider would contribute to its varia-
tion. Because the NRCA is constructed using exports to
all importing countries instead of bilateral exports, we can
view these exporters as serving the world market together.
As a result, we estimate the 12 equations simultaneously as
a seemingly unrelated regression system, with potentially
correlated, cross-equation errors.
11 Recent drought events in Australia have increased prices, but Australia
remains an efficient producer with high returns (Behrendt & Weeks,
2017).
12We note that our observation of relatively stable comparative advan-
tage in beef for Australia and New Zealand, especially in the late 2010s, is
consistent with Sanderson and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2011), who model the
long-run impacts of climate change on countries’ comparative advantage
in the livestock industry.
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Estimating the long-run effect of the BSE outbreak on
comparative advantage is our main interest. We first dis-
cuss the construction of the variables that we use in the
regression model to capture the long-run effect of the BSE
event. Rather than simply estimating the average differ-
ence of comparative advantage in beef before and after the
2003 BSE outbreak with a BSE dummy variable, our goal
is to examine any possible nonlinear response over time.
To do so, we first generate nonlinear trend variables using
the restricted cubic spline function. The intuition behind
constructing the spline function is to first split the sample
period with knots, where each knot defines the end of one
segment and the start of another; each segment between
knots is then fitted with a curve, whereas periods outside
this range (i.e., segments before the first knot and after the
last knot) are fitted linearly.13 In our main specification,
the restricted cubic spline function generated five knots at
years 1983, 1991, 2000, 2009, and 2016, respectively. After
constructing the trend variables, we made them interact
with the BSE dummy variable (doing so means the trend
variables prior to 2003 will have zero values). The purpose
of creating the interaction terms is twofold. First, we want
to control any nonlinear effect of the 2003 BSE outbreak on
comparative advantage in beef in the postevent period. Sec-
ond, by only fitting these trend variables in the postevent
period, we avoid overfitting our model over the full sample
period.
We estimate the system of equations specified in
Equation (2):
𝑁𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑦 = 𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑦 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑦 + 𝛽𝑖3𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑦
+ 𝛽𝑖4𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑦 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑦 + 𝛽𝑖6𝑡1𝑦
+ 𝛽𝑖7𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡1𝑦 + 𝛽𝑖8𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡2𝑦 + 𝛽𝑖9𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦
× 𝑡3𝑦 + 𝛽𝑖10𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡4𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑦. (2)
Consistent with Equation (1), 𝑖 denotes country, and
𝑦 denotes year. For each country (ignoring subscripts),
𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is the cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio,14 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 is
the corn futures price (identical across all equations), 𝑐𝑝𝑖 is
the inflation rate for consumer prices, 𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the national
currency per SDR that we use as the indicator for exchange
rate, and 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑈𝑆 is the meat slaughtering labor
cost that only appears in the U.S. equation. 𝑡1 is a linear
13 These nonlinear trend variables, and the locations and num-
ber of knots are generated using STATA’s mkspline command. See
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rmkspline.pdf.
14We prefer the cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio to two separate variables
of cattle stock and cattle slaughter in the equation to avoid potential
high collinearity between the two variables. The correlation coefficients
between cattle stock and cattle slaughtered for most countries are above
0.7.
trend variable. 𝑡2, 𝑡3, and 𝑡4 are nonlinear trend variables
generated using the restricted cubic spline function, which
alongwith the linear trend variable, are interactedwith the
BSE dummy variable that equals zero prior to 2003, and
one afterwards.
One concernwithEquation (2) is thatwhile 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
contributes to the variation of NRCA, it is likely a channel
through which the BSE outbreak impacts a country’s
NRCA in beef (i.e., an outcome variable of BSE outbreak).
For instance, the United States may decrease its cattle
slaughter rate in response to import bans from other
countries after the BSE outbreak. This suggests that the
effect of the BSE outbreak on NRCA can be biased toward
statistical insignificance once 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is held constant
in the regression. In the extreme case, if one believes that
𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is the only channel through which the BSE
outbreak impacts NRCA, then one would erroneously
conclude that there is no correlation between the BSE out-
break and beef export competitiveness from the regression
result after controlling for 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. In such case, the
variable 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is often referred to as “bad controls”
in the econometrics literature (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
One way to avoid the “bad controls” problem is to
exclude that variable from the regression. However, this
comes with a cost that the regression may instead suffer
from omitted variable bias. We use a method in the spirit
of the hedonic demand theory formulated by Rosen (1974),
which is commonly used in the literature studying demand
for differentiated products or for nonmarket goods.
The hedonic approach features a pricing equation that
regresses, for instance, the price of a differentiated good on
a vector of characteristic variables. One can then obtain the
residual term from the regression, which is interpreted as
the implicit price of the product not explained by the char-
acteristic variables.15 Our application implements a first-
stage regression of 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 on the post-BSE trend vari-
ables to obtain the predicted error for each country:
𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑦 = 𝛾𝑖0 + 𝛾𝑖1𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡1𝑦 + 𝛾𝑖2𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡2𝑦
+ 𝛾𝑖3𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡3𝑦 + 𝛾𝑖4𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡4𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑦. (3)
Our goal here is to recover the portion of the variation
in 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 that is not an outcome of the BSE event.
By construction, the predicted error term 𝜖𝑖𝑦 , the resid-
ual variation of 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, is not correlated with the
post-BSE trend variables. We then replace 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
with 𝜖𝑖𝑦 in Equation (2) to estimate the following system
of equations:16
15 See Trajtenberg (1989) and Crespi et al. (2016) for examples using pre-
dicted error terms in regressions containing variables with hedonic fea-
tures.
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F IGURE 3 Predicted NRC—BSE versus no-BSE [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
𝑁𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑦 = 𝛼𝑖0 + 𝛼𝑖1?̂?𝑖𝑦 + 𝛼𝑖2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑦 + 𝛼𝑖3cpiiy
+ 𝛼𝑖4𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑦 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑦 + 𝛼𝑖6𝑡1𝑦
+ 𝛼𝑖7𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡1𝑦 + 𝛼𝑖8𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡2𝑦 + 𝛼𝑖9𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡3𝑦
+ 𝛼𝑖10𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑦 × 𝑡4𝑦 + 𝜉𝑖𝑦 (4)
where all variables are the same as in Equation (2), except
for 𝜖𝑖𝑦 , the residual variation of 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜.
16We present and discuss the result using the unaltered cattle stock-to-
slaughter ratio in the Online Appendix.
We standardize the NRCA in Equation (4) so that the
interpretation of the estimated coefficients will be how
many standard deviations of change in NRCA given a
unit change in a right-hand-side variable. The results of
interest, however, are the predicted values of NRCA from
the regression model. Once Equation (4) is estimated, we
obtain the predicted NRCA for all countries. We also pre-
dict the NRCA under the counterfactual scenario of no
BSE outbreak in 2003 by replacing the BSE dummy vari-
able with zero values in the post-BSE periods to study the
impacts of the BSE outbreak.
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4.3 Estimation results
For brevity, although the system of equations is for the top
12 beef exporting nations, the discussion of findings will
focus on the United States as well as the most recent top
five exporters: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and New
Zealand. Table 2 presents the estimation of the SURmodels
from Equation (4) for all 12 countries.
Given that there are 37 observations in each equation,
we adopt the small sample adjustment when performing
the estimation.17 Inmost cases, the coefficients of variables
related to cost of production are not statistically signifi-
cant, except for the meat packer labor cost in the United
States equation. Still, the regression models fit the varia-
tion of NRCA well based on the R-square values for the
top five exporting countries, suggesting the variation is
mostly explained by the trend variables that capture other
unobserved underlying changes in factors contributing to
comparative advantage.18 We also perform the augmented
Dickey–Fuller test on the predicted residual for each equa-
tion, rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root.
Next we turn to the presentation of the predicted NRCA
over time from the SUR estimations as shown in Fig-
ure 3.19 Our model predicts that not only would the United
States have continued having comparative advantage (i.e.,
NRCA > 0) in beef after 2003, but it would have steadily
increased in the absence of the BSE event. In actuality,
the United States today is only as competitive as it was 20
years ago. A simple test of the model is that a similar story
is observed for Canada, which was also impacted by a BSE
outbreak in 2002.20
On the other hand, we observe that Australia, Brazil,
and New Zealand would have shown decreased compar-
ative advantages in beef without the 2003 BSE outbreak
and these three countries were all on track to lose their
comparative advantages (i.e., NRCA< 0) in beef over time,
ceteris paribus. Mexico’s NRCA would have displayed lit-
tle change had there been no BSE outbreak. This is likely
because Mexico, similar to India, has not been directly
competing with Australia, New Zealand, and the United
17 Instead of the number of sample observations 𝑛, the alternate divisor
used to compute the covariancematrix takes the form
√
(𝑛 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑛 − 𝑘𝑗),
where 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑘𝑗 are the numbers of parameters in equation 𝑖 and 𝑗 (Kauer-
mann & Carroll, 2001).
18 R2 values for the top five exporters are around 90%, and lower for Mex-
ico at around 60%.
19 To save space, figures of the prediction results for the six other countries
are presented in the Online Appendix.
20 Canada, while also hit by BSE and whose NRCA has been trending
downward since, did not experience the sharp decline that United States
did. This is likely due to the availability of a traceability program in
Canada that was not available in the United States.
States in the large markets of Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan.
We check the robustness of the results by exploring alter-
native specifications of our SUR model. The estimation
results from using the cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio in
Equation (2) are qualitatively like those using the resid-
ual variation of the ratio that is free of the 2003 BSE effect.
This suggests that the impact of the outbreak on a country’s
comparative advantage was not through the channel of the
cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio. One concernwith including
multiple nonlinear trend variables would result in over-
fitting of our model. We also estimate Equation (4), but
replace the post-BSE nonlinear trend variables generated
by the restricted cubic spline functionwith only the second
order of the linear trend variable. These results are consis-
tent with the previous SUR model.21
5 CONCLUSIONS
As trade disruptions made headlines in 2018–2019, one
concern was the long-run impacts to export competitive-
ness. Such impacts are difficult to ascertain untilmore data
become available. Phytosanitary emergencies can provide
insight into these potential impacts because they cause dis-
ruptions that are often expected to be short-lived, similar to
trade disputes. What we see however is that even a short-
termmarket closure can lead to long-term consequences to
market structure that linger beyond the event’s conclusion.
Trade negotiatorswho drag their feet can hurt the long-run
competitiveness of their own country. In this study,we pro-
vide evidence of the effect of the 2003 BSE outbreak in the
United States on global beef export competitiveness. We
first show that the comparative advantage of the U.S. beef
sector in the world market was significantly impacted by
the BSE outbreak of 2003, but while export values eventu-
ally returned to preoutbreak levels, comparative advantage
has not. The international beef market has become more
competitive since the outbreak. We also predict compara-
tive advantages under the counterfactual scenario of no-
BSE event. Our results show that in the absence of the BSE
outbreak, the U.S. beef sector would have been increas-
ingly more competitive by 2017 than it actually was.
A criticism of our approach might be in the use of the
SUR model instead of relying on a natural experiment.
After all, only theUnited States andCanadawere impacted
directly with BSE in 2002 and 2003, which might lend
itself to a comparison of impacted versus nonimpacted
exporters. Recent developments in the causal inference lit-
erature, for example, might provide alternative methods
21We thank an anonymous referee for raising this check. Tables and fig-
ures for the additional results are presented in the Online Appendix.
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that seem to fit this setting. Abadie, Diamond, and Hain-
mueller (2010) propose a synthetic control method that is
commonly used to estimate treatment effects where the
treatment is at the aggregate level, and there is only a single
treated unit (e.g., a country). The advantage of this method
is, instead of extrapolating the data to predict the no-BSE
scenario (i.e., replacing the BSE dummy variable with zero
values after 2003), we might directly estimate the counter-
factual scenario using other countries that we argue were
not impacted by the BSE outbreak as the control units.
However, such methods are problematic given that com-
peting countries will pick up the lost U.S. market share. In
other words, natural experiments are biased because—in
this case—spillover effects of the BSE event invalidate the
experiment: there is no control group. SUR controls for cor-
related error terms, on the other hand.
Another criticism of our method might be in misin-
terpreting why the United States (and Canada) suffered
for such a long time from the BSE outbreak. It could be
that consumers changed their preferences for U.S. beef,
something for which our model does not account. How-
ever, research that studies the BSE outbreak and consumer
response in theUnited States find somewhatmixed results,
and it appears that BSE had only a temporary effect on
consumer demand (Pritchett, Johnson, Thilmany,&Hahn,
2007). Marsh et al. (2008) study the effects of the U.S. BSE
outbreak on domestic fed cattle prices finding that the
impacts of BSE on demand come from the trade bans, not
from changes in domestic consumer preferences.
Research studying the potential impacts of the 2018–
2019 China-U.S. trade disputes is important but is lim-
ited to descriptive analyses or simulation studies for which
changes to market structure (e.g. equilibrium displace-
ment) can only be guessed in the short run (Balistreri et al.,
2018;Marchant &Wang, 2018). Asmore data become avail-
able, these studies take on greater information. Even with
its “comparing apples to oranges” limitations, the lesson
from our BSE case study has an important implication.
Using longitudinal data on beef exports before and after
the 2003 BSE event, we directly observe longer impacts
of a significant, albeit arguably short-lived, trade interrup-
tion and show that a country’s export competitiveness can
take a long time to recover, if at all. Relatedly, Furceri,
Hannan, Ostry, andRose (2018) estimate themedium-term
impact of countries that impose trade barriers and find that
countries raising tariffs actually experience decreased pro-
ductivity, but not improved trade balance, suggesting mar-
kets disrupted do not easily bounce back after the disrup-
tion, regardless of being on one side or the other of the
trade barrier. Our findings also shed light on the implica-
tion of the african swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in China
since late 2018. China increased its pork imports due to
domestic supply shortages, yet U.S. pork producers were
limited in gaining as much market share in part due to
the ongoing trade disputes (Xiong & Zhang, 2019). Future
research should study whether U.S. comparative advan-
tage was helped by ASF but harmed by the dispute.
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